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II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY
A.

The Officer’s Mistake of Law Was Unreasonable and the Detention
Violated Mr. Stewart’s Rights Under the Fourth Amendment
1.

An officer gains no Fourth Amendment advantage through a
sloppy study of the law

Nampa Police Officer Travis Poore relied on his training and a field manual
to determine that Ordinance 1057 established a default speed limit of 20 mph on all
Nampa City streets without posted speed limits. MTS Tr. p. 22, ln. 2-5, p. 29, 8-25.
The state conceded that Ordinance 1057 was repealed in 1988 and prepared to call
the city engineer as a witness, presumably to establish that a map at the city
engineer’s office and Ordinance 2129 established a 20 mph along 10th Avenue
South. However, the magistrate declined to hear this testimony because it found
that Officer Poore reasonably relied on the antiquated ordinance and his training in
enforcing a 20 mph speed limit.
Whether Officer Poore’s mistake regarding the enforceable speed limit along
10th Avenue South can be construed as reasonable presents a straightforward
question of statutory construction. Heien v. N. Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 541 (2014)
(Justices Kagan and Ginsburg joins, concurrence); see also United States v.
Stanbridge, 813 F.3d 1032, 1037 (7th Cir. 2016) (construing applicable statutes to
determine if officer’s mistake was reasonable); State v. Eldridge, 790 S.E.2d 740,
743-44 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016); State v. Stoll, 370 P.3d 1130, 1135 (Arizona Ct. App.
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2016) (same). Title 49 of the Idaho Code and Ordinance 2129 impose unambiguous
requirements for enforcing speed limits and, therefore, Officer Poore’s reliance on a
training manual and outdated ordinance was not reasonable.
Neither the state nor the district court addressed whether the law regarding
municipal speed limits is ambiguous. Instead, the state urges the officer was not
obligated to know the law’s requirements. See Respondent’s Brief, p. 14-15, 17. The
law is to the contrary. However, “an officer can gain no Fourth Amendment
advantage through a sloppy study of the laws he is duty-bound to enforce.”
Stanbridge, 813 F.3d at 1037, citing Heien, 135 S.Ct. at 539-40. Indeed, courts have
specifically rejected that “‘an officer's reliance on an incorrect memo or training
program from the police department” supports an objectively reasonable mistake of
law. Stoll, 370 P.3d at 1135, citing Heien, 135 S.Ct. at 541 (Kagan, J., concurring)
(internal citation omitted).
The states does not address these principles or otherwise apply applicable
jurisprudence. Instead, it continues to rely Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37
(1979), where the Court held officers are not required to foresee that a court will
declare a law unconstitutional. As previously argued, Nampa’s failure to follow
unambiguous statutory requirements is not analogous to a subsequent judicial
declaration that an ordinance is unconstitutional. Appellant’s Brief, p. 15-18. The
state offers no argument to the contrary.
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Officer Poore mistakenly believed there was an enforceable 20 mph speed
limit along 10th Avenue South in December 2014. The statutory framework is
unambiguous and the officer’s mistake unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
2.

The appellate record does not support a finding that there was
a 20 mph default speed limit in effect at the time the officer
stopped Mr. Stewart

According to the state, it “is undeniable that Officer Poore was correct that a
Nampa City Ordinance set a default speed limit of 20” mph in unposted areas at the
time the officer stopped Mr. Stewart. Respondent’s Brief, p. 15. The record fails to
support this assertion.
Instead, the evidence before the magistrate consisted of Officer Poore’s
testimony that the speed limit was not enforceable when he stopped Mr. Stewart for
traveling 26 mph. The officer also testified that Nampa was fixing the problem by
posting proper “signage” and that he could enforce the 20 mph speed limit along
10th Avenue South at the time of the hearing. Officer Poore explained that he
understood that Ordinance 1057 established a default speed limit because his
training manual and field training officer so advised him.
The state conceded that Ordinance 1057 had been repealed and presented no
evidence of an enforceable default speed limit at the suppression hearing. The state
planned to present the city engineer’s testimony concerning sign placement and the
operative ordinance, which apparently establishes the speed limits areas via city
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map maintained in the engineer’s office. The magistrate declined to hear this
evidence because it found that Officer Poore reasonably relied on his training and
Ordinance 1057.
As the state conceded at oral argument before the district court, the appellate
record is “inadequate” to establish whether the speed limit could be enforced with
the signs as they existed when the officer stopped Mr. Stewart. Tr. p. 16, ln. 7-16.
Nor does the officer’s testimony that the “welcome signs” failed to meet statutory
appearance requirements support the state’s contention that those defects were the
only manner in which the city had failed to comply with the operative code. Indeed,
as noted in the Appellant’s Brief, Nampa did not have a default speed limit until
2016. Appellant’s Brief, p. 14.
The state claims Mr. Stewart presented neither argument nor authority to
support that the signs did not comply with the Idaho Code sections incorporating
MUTCD standards. Respondent’s Brief, p. 16. However, the officer testified that the
20 mph speed limit was not previously enforceable and the state conceded the signs
were not in compliance and were being replaced. The state argued that compliance
with the proper standards was irrelevant because the officer did not need to know
the operative law. The magistrate and district court agreed. It is the state that
failed to present evidence or argument that the speed limit was enforceable.
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The state also cites to a single subsection the MUTCD requiring speed limit
signs at jurisdictional boundaries and suggests that because 10th Ave South is
located wholly within Nampa, the MUTCD required neither speed limit signs or a
default sign. Respondent’s Brief, p. 4, n. 3. The state does not mention the two
preceding subsections, cited in the Appellant’s Brief and which provide that “signs,
indicating speed limits for which posting is required by law, shall be located at the
points of change from one speed limit to another.” Appellant’s Brief, p. 12. Section
2B.13.03. Speed Limit signs showing the next speed limit must be posted “at the
downstream end of the section to which a speed limit applies.” Section 2B.13.04.
“Additional Speed Limit signs shall be installed beyond major intersections and at
other locations where it is necessary to remind road users of the speed limit that is
applicable.” Section 2B.13.04.
When read together, these sections fail to support the state’s argument and
instead reflect that cities must do more than post compliant default signs at
jurisdictional boundaries to enforce a city wide default speed limit. Nampa
undoubtedly applied a myriad of considerations detailed in the MUTCD in posting
correct “signage” following Mr. Stewart’s stop and in promulgating a default speed
limit 2 years after that stop in 2016. The city engineer may have testified to some of
these considerations had the state called him as a witness. The record fails to
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support the state’s assertion that there was an enforceable default speed limit in
2014.
It is uncontested that the officer relied on a repealed ordinance and that
Nampa had not properly established a 20 mph speed limit on 10th Avenue South on
the night in question. Neither Title 49 nor Ordinance 2129’s requirements for
establishing and enforcing speed limits are unambiguous. Mr. Stewart’s detention
violated the Fourth Amendment and the magistrate erred in denying Mr. Stewart’s
motion to suppress.
C.

To Constitute a Reasonable Suspicion as Required to Support
an Investigative Detention Under the Idaho Constitution
Requires Courts to Evaluate the Officer’s Understanding of the
Facts Against the Actual State of the Law
Mr. Stewart argued to this Court, as he did below, that upholding the stop in

this case would conflict with the manner in which Idaho has applied its independent
exclusionary rule for decades. In approximately six pages of argument, Mr. Stewart
discussed several Idaho cases discussing the history and origin of our independent
exclusionary rule, as well as cases from other states that have rejected Heien's
holding under their own constitutions. Appellant’s Brief p. 21-26. Mr. Stewart thus
argued that even if the officer’s mistake in this case was reasonable under the Heien
Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, the ensuing stop violated Article
1, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution.
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The state’s only response is in a footnote in which it claims Mr. Stewart failed
to examine several relevant criteria to support a divergence including “textual”
differences and state constitutional history. Respondent’s Brief, p. 14, n. 7. The
detailed arguments in the Appellant’s Brief refute the state’s note and no further
reply is warranted.
III. CONCLUSION
For all the reasons set forth above and in Mr. Stewart’s Opening Brief, he
respectfully asks this Court to reverse the district court’s order on intermediate
appeal and remand with instruction to reverse the magistrate’s judgment and order
of probation and to allow Mr. Stewart to withdraw his guilty plea.
Respectfully submitted this 22nd day of June 2017.
FYFFE LAW

/s/ Robyn Fyffe
ROBYN FYFFE
Attorney for David Stewart
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